

1 June 1953

Commandant
United States Air Force, Air University
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

SUBJECT: Comments on Working Paper on Chinese Communism:
Mao Tse-tung's "Lean-to-one-Side" Policy

1. We have read the working paper Mao Tse-tung's
"Lean-to-one-Side" Policy [redacted]

[redacted] and have prepared the
comments contained in the memorandum enclosed.

2. We appreciate the opportunity to read the working
papers prepared for the Air Force on Communist China, and
regret that the pressure of our own work does not permit more
expeditious comment on more papers.

3. We would appreciate the continued receipt of announce-
ments concerning production of other papers in this series.

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COMMENTS ON ADVANCE EDITION OF MAO TSE-TUNG'S "LEAN-TO-ONE-SIDE" POLICY BY HENRY WEI (15 October 1952)

1. In its present form the paper is of limited value in adding to the understanding of the Chinese Communist regime. It requires considerable editorial attention and contains numerous historical inaccuracies and questionable generalizations based on inadequate data. The paper is too short if it is meant to be a fully documented account of relations between the Chinese Communists and the USSR, and too long if it is meant to establish the simple fact that Mao Tse-tung professes to accept the well-known Leninist-Stalinist dictum that the world is divided into two camps.

2. The Chinese Communist policy of "leaning to one side" is merely Mao's way of phrasing the standard Communist principle that the world is divided into camps and that "you are either for us or against us". The emphasis on this principle in Chinese Communist writings indicates a need to overcome strong Chinese doubts over a policy which cuts China off from the West and places it in close alliance with the USSR. It is useful to establish, as this and other more carefully documented studies have done, Mao's adherence to the "lean to one side" policy since his earliest years in the Communist party. However, his adherence to the policy does not, by itself, provide a test of his future intentions with regard to relations with the USSR. The writer of the paper appears to recognize this fact, and in an effort to enlarge the scope of the discussion, he enters into the entire field of relations between the Chinese Communists and the USSR. The subject of these relations requires much more exhaustive and careful research.

3. It is suggested that papers in this series not attempt to make judgments on matters of a current nature where the only reliable data, if any, can be found in classified sources. For example, it is uneconomical for the researcher to discuss the extent and nature of Soviet military assistance to the Chinese Communists, except in most general terms and when necessary to complete an argument.

4. The following comments refer to specific sections of the paper:

a. On page 5 the author misrepresents the position of Ch'en Tu-hsin, ascribing to him the "sin" of right-deviationism. As has been well documented by Schwartz

in Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao Tse-tung and by Messrs Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank in Documentary History of Chinese Communism. Ch'en was simply following the approved Comintern line in collaborating with the Kuomintang at the time.

b. On page 22 it is correctly stated that all important shifts in the CCP line have been in tune with international Communist tactics. From this it cannot be demonstrated, however, that Mao has ever sacrificed his own interests in order to adopt policies advantageous to the USSR.

c. Several pages are consumed in dealing with the question of the extent of Soviet control or influence in Communist China only to conclude that data does not exist to support an assessment.

d. The discussion of Mao's relations with the West on pages 31-36 is rather superficial and omits many important factors in this critical period of history.

e. The anglophobic cast of the paragraph starting on the bottom of page 35 is gratuitous and factually unfair and incomplete.

f. Chapter IV implies that Chinese Communist anti-American propaganda was inspired and initialled by Soviet advisors and "cultural" workers who arrived in Pei'ping after October 1949. There is no evidence of a careful effort to document this sequence, and it is well known that anti-American propaganda has been part of the Chinese Communist output in varying degrees of intensity since 1920.

g. The statements concerning the Chinese economy and the ability of the Soviet Bloc to assist the industrial development of China appear to be generalizations which have not been tested by expert research.

h. There is no basis for calling Liu Shao-chi an "ardent Russophile" (page 68). He is probably the leading Chinese Communist theoretician — excepting Mao — but his facility with dialectical materialism does not make him a Russophile.